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Abstract
This paper aims at providing some empirical evidence about the impact of monetary policy on
Kashyap and Stein (2000) using a panel data set comprising 312 banks observed quarterly
over the period 1993-2000.
We find that bank lending decreases after a monetary policy tightening. Moreover, as in
several other Euro area economies, banks’ liquidity appears to impact significantly on their
lending behavior.
bank lending at the microeconomic level. We estimate a model close to that proposed by
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Non technical summary:
The aim of this paper is to check for the possible existence of a bank lending channel in
France. As it has already been documented in several papers for the US, following a monetary
policy tightening, not all banks adjust their lending in the same way. In particular, small banks
as well as undercapitalized ones have been shown to react more strongly than large and/or
highly capitalized banks. The share of liquid assets has also been shown to play a role in this
respect, with liquid banks being able to maintain their loan portfolio more easily than illiquid
ones.
In order to assess whether French banks exhibit similar behaviors, we have estimated a
dynamic reduced form model close to that proposed in Kashyap and Stein (2000). This model
allows for asymmetries in loan supply across banks, depending on their size, liquidity and
capitalization. The estimates are run on a panel of 312 French banks observed quarterly over
the period 1993-2000.
We do find some asymmetry between liquid and illiquid banks, with the latter being more
sensitive to a monetary policy tightening. This result is in accordance with that obtained for
several other countries of the Euro area (see Ehrmann et al. (2001)). It constitutes an
indication that, as far as they can, banks somehow reduce their portfolio of liquid assets in
order to maintain their loan portfolio.
Contrary to what has been found for the US (e.g. see Kashyap and Stein (1995, 2000) and
(size and capitalization) to have any significant impact on bank lending. Several explanations
can be proposed for this result. First, small French banks are, relatively speaking, most often
better capitalized than large ones. Then, there might be a kind of compensation between the
impacts of those two variables. However, including a double interaction of monetary policy
with size and capitalization does not lead to a significant coefficient. In other words, we have
not been able to show that, after a restrictive monetary policy, small and under-capitalized
banks shrink their loan supply more strongly than others. Another possible explanation of this
result, at least for size, is that the loan demand addressed to small banks is less elastic with
respect to the interest rate than that addressed to large banks (see Baumel and Sevestre
Kishan and Opiela (2000)), we do not find the two other banks characteristics we considerECB • Working Paper No 101 • December 2001 6
(2000)). This might explain why we do not get a significant coefficient for size. In our
reduced form model, this coefficient might not only account for loan supply differences across
small and large banks but also for loan demand differences, which go the other way round and
thus compensate each other.
At the “aggregate” level, our estimates show a significant impact of monetary policy on bank
lending. An increase of 100 basis points in the interest rate leads, in the long run, to a 1.5-2%
decrease in the outstanding amount of loans for the “average bank”, and of around 2.5-3% at
the “aggregate level”.
Nevertheless, some more work needs to be done to assess better the influence of monetary
policy decisions on bank lending. First, it would probably be more satisfactory to get an
evaluation of the impact of those decisions on new loans granted by banks rather than on their
outstanding amount. Indeed, banks cannot easily adjust downward their loan portfolio, at least
for long-term loans, which represent a significant proportion of bank lending. Second, one
should also have a look at the impact of monetary policy on the interest rate charged by banks
to their customers (e.g., see Mojon (2001)). Indeed, the availability of banks’ loans to
households and businesses is important but does not totally reflect the consequences of
monetary policy decisions on the financing of non-bank economic agents.ECB • Working Paper No 101 • December 2001  7
1 Introduction
Most economists would agree that, at least in the short run, monetary policy can significantly
influence the course of the real economy. There is far less agreement, however, about exactly
how monetary policy exerts its influence. To a great extent, empirical analysis of the effects of
monetary policy has treated the monetary transmission mechanism itself as a ''black box''
(Bernanke and Gertler (1995)).
In Europe, the launch of the Euro has raised, and still does, questions about possible
asymmetries in the response of the Euro zone economies to the ECB monetary policy. Indeed,
one can suspect the existence of differences in the monetary policy transmission mechanisms
across countries which could lead to uneven impacts of the ECB decisions (e.g., see L. Guiso
et alii (1999), C. Favero et alii (1999) and C. Favero and F. Giavazzi (2001)). Although much
work has already been done for analyzing this issue using a macroeconomic approach, a
growing literature argues about the interest, if not the necessity, to use microeconomic data,
either on banks or on firms to get more appropriate evaluations of these effects. Indeed, over
(or besides) possible cross-country differences, a strong heterogeneity of monetary policy
responses seems to exist across agents within countries. Concerning banks in particular,
several papers have analyzed the response of US banks to monetary policy decisions. They
show that responses differ depending on banks' size and the structure of their balance sheet
few papers have, along the same lines, specifically focused on European countries (e.g. see C.
Favero et alii (1999)).
This paper fits in this literature. Its aim is to look for the existence of cross-sectional
differences in the way banks with varying characteristics respond to policy shocks, or, in other
words, whether it is possible to find evidence for the lending view for France. We estimate a
dynamic reduced form model close to that proposed in Kashyap and Stein (2000). This model
allows for asymmetries in loan supply across banks, depending on their size, liquidity and
capitalization. The estimates are run on a panel of 312 French banks observed quarterly over
the period 1993-2000.
(e.g. see R. Kishan and T. Opiela (2000) and A. Kashyap and J. Stein (1995 and 2000)). AECB • Working Paper No 101 • December 2001 8
credit channel and the available empirical evidence about it in France. We describe the main
features of the French banking system in section 3. We present the model we estimate, the
data we use and our econometric results in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2. The lending channel: theory and empirical evidence for France
2.1 The lending channel theory: a brief reminder
According to the “interest rate channel”, or “money channel”, a change in interest rates affects
households’ and firms’ spending (i.e. consumption and investment expenses) by modifying
the user cost of capital and borrowing conditions. As regards consumption, the impact of a
monetary policy tightening can be, as usual, decomposed into a substitution and an income
effect. While the former is unambiguously negative, the latter depends on the net asset
positions of consumers, the proportion of consumer debt at floating rates, as well as the
maturity of debts. Higher interest rates induce a wealth increase of net creditors but a decrease
of the cash-flow of debtors, at least for those indebted at a floating rate. Indeed, the proportion
of bank lending at short, or adjustable, rates strengthens the transmission mechanism. This
effect is generally believed to be stronger on consumer durables than on other consumer
spending. The impact on firms’ investment also depends on the structure of loans, especially
on their maturities and on how much is given at adjustable rates.
The bank lending and balance sheet channels should not be considered as an alternative to the
traditional monetary transmission mechanism. They are rather seen as complementary
mechanisms possibly strengthening the direct interest rate effects (Bernanke and Gertler
(1995)). Indeed, according to the credit and balance sheet channels theories, monetary policy
has, besides its direct effects on consumption and spending, indirect effects passing through
its impact on the cost incurred by banks and firms for raising external funds. As a matter of
fact, a change in monetary policy that raises or lowers open-market interest rates tends to
change the external finance premium in the same direction.
More precisely, the ''balance sheet channel'' or ''broad credit channel'', stresses the potential
impact of changes in monetary policy on borrowers' balance sheets and income statements,
including variables such as borrowers' net worth, cash flow and liquid assets. This channel
may occur even if loans and bonds are perfect substitutes in the balance sheets of banks and
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 is devoted to a brief recollection of theECB • Working Paper No 101 • December 2001  9
firms: it is associated with credit constraints that may arise when firms' ability to borrow
depends on the availability of collateral. An increase in interest rates reduces the market value
of collateral (real estate values, for instance), thus affecting a firm's access to bank lending.
The ''bank lending channel'' or ''strict credit channel'' focuses more narrowly on the possible
effect of monetary policy actions on the supply of loans by depository institutions. It may only
work when deposits and bonds are imperfect substitutes in the balance sheets of banks: In that
case, following a reduction in liquidity, banks cannot turn freely to the bond market, due to
the external finance premium. Then, they must reduce the amount of loans they supply and/or
further increase the interest rate they charge for loans, thus amplifying the initial effects of the
monetary policy tightening.
2.2. Previous econometric evidence on the credit channel for France
Following papers by Bernanke and Blinder (1992) and Kashyap, Stein and Wilcox (1993) on
the United States, several contributions, based on the estimation of VAR models using
aggregate macroeconomic time-series, have looked for the possible existence of a bank
lending channel in France.
Goux (1996), studying the 1970-1994 period with a structural VAR model, finds no evidence
of a bank lending channel in France. However, the strong changes that occurred in the French
banking industry over these years cast some doubt about this conclusion. Coudert and Mojon
(1997), studying the period 1979-Q1 to 1993-Q2 with a VAR model, find that the decrease of
outstanding loans after an increase in the interest rate is significant. Barran, Coudert, Mojon
(1997), studying France among nine European countries, also with a VAR model, find for the
period 1976 to 1994 that after a contractionary shock to interest rates, deposits (including
interest-bearing deposits) tend to increase while loans decrease more than money. This tends
to prove that the banks’ balance sheets structure is modified under a tightening of monetary
policy. This is consistent with the credit channel view. Bellando and Pollin (1996) analyze the
influence of monetary policy on the spread between bank lending interest rates and money
market rates over the period 1984:2-1994:4. They show that the spreads contain information
about future activity, but their tests do not provide a formal proof of the influence of monetary
policy on activity via the credit channel.ECB • Working Paper No 101 • December 2001 10
the findings of these papers are certainly consistent with the lending view, they are also
consistent with other interpretations. This is why the literature has moved to using
microeconomic datasets in order to assess the existence of a lending channel. Indeed, the
lending view predicts that a tight monetary policy should induce more financial difficulties for
small firms, which rely primarily on banks, than for large firms, who typically have greater
access to nonbank sources of external finance. A number of papers provide evidence that is
consistent with this prediction for the United States. A few papers also provide evidence for
France. Rosenwald (1998a), using the Credit Cost Survey conducted by the Bank of France,
observes that the spread of rates between loans of different amounts rises when the refunding
rate is decreasing. This is explained by the existence of an external premium: decreasing
refunding rates allow firms that usually do not get external finance (due to information
problems) to enter the credit market. Evidence about the existence of a credit channel for non-
financial firms in France is also reported in Chatelain and Teurlai (2000) and Chatelain and
Tiomo (2001).
Kashyap and Stein (1995, 2000) were the first to address the lending view issue using
individual bank balance-sheets data for the US. According to the lending view, the Central
Bank can alter the loan supply behavior of banks because banks cannot find perfect substitutes
for deposits. As regards France, the available empirical evidence does not lead to a clear
conclusion. Martin and Rosenwald (1996) show that the rate served to banks issuing CD’s is
significantly bank dependent; which may be an indication for the existence of a lending
channel. In a second paper, Rosenwald (1998b) studies the sensitivity of the CD's rate to the
amount issued in order to check whether a bank can issue as many CDs as it wants without
paying any premium. Using data on the CDs issued by 400 banks from January 1993 to
February 1996, she finds a statistically significant, but very small, elasticity of the CD's rate to
the issued amount. More recently, in a cross-country comparative paper, Favero, Giavazzi,
and Flabbi (1999), do not find any evidence of a significant response of banks’ loans to the
monetary tightening which occurred at the very beginning of the 90’s, in any of the four
European countries considered. They find that in Germany, Italy and France, small banks use
their excess liquidity to expand loans in presence of a monetary policy restriction.
A discussion of the pitfalls of these approaches is given in Kashyap and Stein (1995): whileECB • Working Paper No 101 • December 2001  11
3 The French banking system: main characteristics and recent evolutions
The structure of the banking industry, its evolution as well as that of the financial system are
of a definitive importance for the way monetary policy can affect the decisions of economic
agents. Indeed, the 90’s have been characterized in France by a reduction in the number of
institutions, an increase of market finance and a steady decline of the interest rate. Moreover,
differences in the structures of banks’ balance sheets may be at the origin of asymmetries in
banks loan supply responses to monetary policy.
3.1 Bank lending and financial markets over the 90’s
The French banking system has modernized a lot over the last 20 years. This is the
consequence of the banking system law of 1984 and the modernization of capital markets
initiated by the 1986 reform. The rationalization of the structure of the French banking
industry, and the more intense competition that followed, has resulted in a steady decline in
the number of credit institutions over the last decade (see table 1).
Concentration in the French banking industry has intensified in recent years. In terms of total
assets, the share of the five largest institutions has expanded by four percentage points from
38.7 % to 42.7 % between 1993 and 1999.
4 Meanwhile, the share of the top twenty has risen
by 11.1 percentage points (to reach 74.3 % at the end of 1999). As regards customer lending,
concentration has also intensified since 1993 but to a lesser extent, with moderate rises in
market share: +2.3 points for the top five (to 46.4 %), +3.6 points for the top ten (to 66.1 %)
and +2 points for the top twenty (to 76.3 %).
5
The reforms of financial markets that were implemented in the 1980's have improved access
to the capital markets for economic agents. Indeed, the last decade has seen an increased
availability of market finance. At the end of 2000, the outstanding amount of commercial
paper was EUR 77.8 billions, against 23.6 in 1993; that is an increase of 200% over a seven
                                                          
4 Cf the annual report 1999 of the Commission Bancaire. These largest institutions include commercial banks and
mutual and cooperative banks, the latter being considered as one entity rather than a multitude of small banks.
5 The concentration of the French banking system is in the average of the European Union. The ratio of
concentration in 1997 (defined as total assets of the top five on total assets of the country) was lower than 30% in
Germany, United Kingdom and Italy; between 40% and 60% for France, Belgium and Spain; and above 70% for
Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands, Portugal and Greece (cf. CECEI (2000)).ECB • Working Paper No 101 • December 2001 12
years period. For CDs, those figures were 128.6 billions and 149.0
6 billions respectively and
58.5 billions, against 68.3 billions in 1993, for medium-term notes. The same evolution can be
observed for bonds and shares. The outstanding volume of bonds was EUR 784 billions at the
end of 2000 while it was only 591 billions in 1993. The Paris stock exchange market
capitalization increased from EUR 410 billions in 1993 to 1,541 billions at the end of 2000,
which means that the capitalization has been multiplied by 3.8 all over the period. At the same
time, the French stock exchange index (CAC40) increased from 2212 points, at the end of
1993, to 5899 points at the end of 2000 (i.e. it has been multiplied by 2.7).
In 1993, non-financial businesses’ liabilities were split into 7% bonds and negotiable debt
securities, 29% loans and 64% shares. This structure, quite stable until the beginning of 1996,
has seen the proportion of shares rising dramatically to 81 % at the end of 2000. But this is
mostly due to the fact that bonds, negotiable debt securities, and shares are valued at their
market price (even for unquoted securities). The increase would be by only 6 percentage
points instead of 17 percentage points if one would look at firms’ accounting data (See
Chatelain and Tiomo (2001)).
As a consequence, the narrowly-defined intermediation rate has decreased from more than
55% in 1993 to less than 45% in 2000. However, this better access to market finance has
essentially been significant for large firms. The financing of small businesses and households
still mainly rests on bank lending (e.g., see Kremp and Sevestre (2000)).
Another consequence of the increased availability of market finance has been the slight
decrease of the share of loans granted to non-financial firms (including individual
corporations) as a fraction of loans to individual and non-financial businesses. In terms of
outstanding amounts, this share has slightly declined from 63% in 1993 to 59% in 2000.
The repartition of the loans outstanding between short-term loans (less than a year) and
medium and long-term loans (more than a year), both for non-financial firms and households
has been quite stable over the period. The share of short-term (respectively, long-term) loans
was around 28% (resp. 72%) for non-financial firms and around 5% (resp. 95%) for
households.
                                                          
6 138.9 for CDs + 10.1 for specialized financial institutions and financial companies notes.ECB • Working Paper No 101 • December 2001  13
Almost all short-term loans for corporations are adjustable-interest rate loans. But only one
half of long-term loans belongs to this category (this proportion has decreased since the
beginning of the 90s; it was then two third of total long-term loans to corporations). Fixed-
interest rate loans for households represent around 90% of total loans.
Short-term loans, both because of their “natural” term difference and of this stronger
proportion of variable interest rate contracts, are expected to depend more strongly on the
monetary policy interest rate than long-term ones. As far as outstanding amounts are
considered, this phenomenon is reinforced by the significant decrease in interest rates that has
been observed over the period.
The Paris interbank offered rate (PIBOR) decreased from 12.9% at the end of January 1993 to
5.9% two years later. After an increase to 8% in April 1995, the decrease resumed to 3.3% at
the end of February 1997. The rate was quite stable until the end of 1998. The EURIBOR,
replacing the PIBOR with the creation of the euro, decreased from 3.1% in January to 2.6% in
May 1999. It then increased to 5% at the end of 2000. This decrease in the interbank offered
rate has been channeled to the cost of credit available to households and businesses. The
evolution of this cost of credit to businesses and households is represented below
7. One of the
key features of the period is the global decline of the interest rates from the beginning of 1995
until the third quarter of 1999. The cost of credit to businesses declined by about 5 percentage
points during this period. The decrease in the cost of credit to individuals was less pronounced
(around 4 percentage points). The rate increases for business between the third quarter of 1999
and 2000 ranged from 1.5 to 2%. The variation was, here again, less pronounced for
households.
The period studied has thus been characterized by an increased competition among banks, a
relative stability of the repartition between short and long-term borrowing, and a steady
decrease of the interest rate. The improved competition among banks is favorable for finding
an impact of monetary policy on bank loans. On the other hand the steady decline of interest
rates might weaken the link between monetary policy and loan supply.
                                                          
7 The two graphics on the cost of credit to households and businesses are quoted from the 1999 Commission
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3.2 The Monetary and Financial Institutions
At the end of 1998, the Monetary and Financial Institutions (MFIs) population was composed
of 1191 entities. These included 369 “commercial” banks, 120 ''mutual and cooperative
banks'' (“banques mutualistes”) which in fact belong to four networks (Credit Agricole,
Banques Populaires, Crédit Mutuel and Crédit Coopératif), 31 savings and provident
institutions (“Caisses d’Epargne”), 22 municipal credit banks (“Caisses de Crédit Municipal”)
and 649 financial companies. The latter can be decomposed into 454 “Type A” finance
companies (AFC), 170 “type B” finance companies (BFC) and 25 specialized financial
institutions (SFI).
The main descriptive characteristics of these MFIs are given in table 2, and their relative
market share in table 3.
8
“Commercial” banks clearly play a prominent role in the French banking system as their
market share was, in 1998, around 50% both in terms of bank lending and deposits
9. The
“mutual and cooperative banks” and “savings and provident institutions” come second.
However, while those banks collect almost all the remaining deposits  (their market share is
42%), their position is less strong on the loan market as they granted about 28% of loans in
1998. Given that municipal credit banks are negligible, the remaining 22% of loans are
granted by finance companies and specialized financial institutions. One interesting feature is
that the subset of specialized financial institutions, although not very numerous, accounts for
more than 40% of this remaining share. This contrasts with the market share of the whole set
of financial companies and specialized financial institutions on the deposits markets, as this
market share is only 6%. Those figures reflect the fact that financial companies are not
allowed to receive deposits for a period shorter than 2 years, a constraint which obviously
reduces a lot the amount of deposits they can collect
10.
                                                          
8 The French supervisor authority (the «Commission Bancaire ») builds up « artificial » banks to take into account
the network nature of «  mutual and cooperative  » banks, by consolidating properly the balance sheets of the
regional branches and that of the head/federal institution. The figures for the four fictive entities corresponding to
the four networks are also reported in table 3.
9 Except where indicated, all subsequent figures in this section refer to the situation at the end of 1998.
10 Given that those companies are not depository institutions, they will be taken out of our sample for our study of
the lending channel; although their market share is not negligible as far as loans are concerned.ECB • Working Paper No 101 • December 2001  15
three items, expressed in terms of ratio over total assets, are taken into consideration: cash and
interbank assets (Liquid1), loans, and securities (securities holding ratio). On the liability side,
four items are reported: interbank liabilities, deposits, securities liabilities, and capital and
reserves.
As liquidity will appear to be particularly important in our discussion, two other measures of
liquidity (on top of Liquid1) are provided. Liquid 1 is a very simple measure of liquidity as it
takes into account only cash and interbank assets on a gross basis. The second measure of
liquidity (Liquid2) provided is almost as simple but includes, on top of cash and interbank
assets, transaction securities and short-term investment securities. These securities are
supposed to be easily marketable, and thus relatively liquid. The third measure of liquidity
(Liquid3) aims at taking account of the banks’ net interbank position. It is defined as the ratio
of the difference “interbank assets-interbank liabilities” over the difference “total assets-
min(interbank assets, interbank liabilities)”. The purpose of this measure is to get rid of the
interbank activity of a bank in order to measure its liquidity. This is particularly important for
“mutual and cooperative banks”, since they are all organized in a network.
In terms of the balance sheet structure, one can observe some important differences: the share
of deposits in total assets is much higher for “mutual and cooperative banks” (65%) and for
“savings and provident institutions” (79%) than it is for “commercial” banks (41%). The share
of interbank liabilities is higher for the latter (32%) than it is for the former groups (13 % for
cooperative banks and 14% for savings banks), while the share of securities in banks’
liabilities is not very different across those categories of banks. It is 8% for “commercial”
banks and 12% for “mutual and cooperative banks”. On the asset side, the share of loans in
total assets is higher for “mutual and cooperative banks” and “savings and provident
institutions” than it is for “commercial” banks. Those discrepancies are compensated by
differences in both interbank assets and securities holdings.
The fact that ''mutual and cooperative banks'' constitute networks entails particular
relationships that are partly reflected in their balance sheet structure
11. Indeed, the federal
institution at the head of the network is legally considered to be responsible for the liquidity
and the solvency of the whole network and this induces specific financial flows between the
                                                          
11 Savings and provident institutions are considered as an independent category all over the period despite their
integration into the sub-group of cooperative banks at the beginning of 2000.
Table 3 also provides information about the structure of balance sheets. On the asset side,
branches and the head of the network.ECB • Working Paper No 101 • December 2001 16
For example, in one of these networks, regional branches have to send a part of the deposits
they collect to the head/federal structure, a part of which does not even appear in their balance
sheet. In other words, those regional branches collect more deposits than indicated in their
balance sheet, which makes it impossible to rely on the balance sheets of these branches. In
order to get relevant figures, the French bank supervisory authority (the “Commission
Bancaire”) then builds up “artificial” banks by consolidating properly the balance sheets of
the regional branches and that of the head/federal institution. We shall use this kind of
aggregate in our subsequent analysis for all but one of them, where the balance sheets of the
regional branches do not differ much from the fictitious aggregate entity, so that each regional
bank has been kept in the econometric sample used below.
3.3 Small banks versus large banks
As one of the main conclusions of previous studies about the credit channel in the US is that
small banks are more strongly affected by a monetary policy tightening than large ones, it
may be worth to have a look at the balance sheet structure of French banks using this
discriminating criterion (see table 4).
The share of credit in small banks’ balance sheets (38%) is higher than that for large banks
(34%). Small banks' balance sheets include a lot more liquidity than the ones of large banks.
The share of cash and interbank operations in total assets (Liquid1) stands at 45% (resp. 32%)
for small (resp. large) banks, as opposed to the share of securities, which is 13% (resp. 31%).
Thus, small banks are more liquid than large banks. This factor could induce a smaller impact
of monetary policy on small banks than on large banks (if, because of informational
asymmetries, size had a specific impact). Moreover, if one looks at capitalization, one may
notice that small banks are a lot more capitalized than large banks. The capitalization ratio is
12.3% for small banks whereas it is only 3.4% for large banks. This might also go against a
stronger impact of monetary policy on small banks’ lending. As regards the liability side,
small banks have slightly more deposits than large banks. The share of deposits in total assets
is 55% for small banks against 49% for large banks. The share of interbank operations is 25%
for small and large banks. The share of securities in total liabilities is only 4% for small
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prediction that states that large banks have less difficulties in accessing external finance by
issuing bonds than small banks.
Furthermore, small banks are more liquid and better capitalized than large banks. If one
assumes that small, illiquid and undercapitalized banks should be more affected by monetary
policy than large, liquid or more capitalized banks, the existence of a lending channel for
small banks might be doubtful. Indeed, there might be a kind of compensation between the
impact of size on the one hand and of liquidity and capitalization on the other hand.
4 The econometric analysis
4.1 The model
The aim of this paper is to give an estimation of the impact of monetary policy on loan supply
and of the possible asymmetry of the effects depending on particular banks' characteristics.
We use the same kind of model as Ehrmann et alii (2001), inspired from a generalization of
the textbook IS-LM model described in Bernanke and Blinder (1988), re-written in first
differences.
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++ Σ ∆ + Σ ∆ + Σ + ∆
 (1)
where  N i ,..., 1 = indexes banks and  i T t ,..., 1 =  time periods (quarters).  it L  are the loans of
bank i  in quarter t  to the non-financial private sector.  t r ∆  represents the first difference of a
nominal short-term interest rate, namely the 3 months interbank interest rate.  t GDP) log( ∆  is
the growth rate of real GDP
13, and  t INFL  the inflation rate computed as the growth rate of the
consumer price index.
Including inflation and GDP growth in the model together with their interaction with bank
characteristics is assumed to account for loan demand effects. Then, under the assumption that
                                                          
12 The model implicitly allows for banks fixed effects, since those effects are discarded in the first difference
representation of the model.
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the demand addressed to each bank is homogeneous with respect to its interest rate elasticity,
the  1j g  interaction coefficients can be interpreted as reflecting the heterogeneity of loan
supply responses across banks. We consider here that size, liquidity and capitalization
(denoted above as  it x ) might have an influence on the way a bank’s loan supply reacts to
monetary policy.
Size (defined here as the log of total assets and centered with respect to its period by period
mean) is often considered as the most obvious proxy for informational asymmetries in either
firm or bank studies, as far as the problem of finding external finance is concerned.
Capitalization may also be important in that respect, as one can expect under-capitalized
banks to have more difficulties in raising external funds than well capitalized ones.
Capitalization is defined here as the ratio of the sum of capital and reserves to total assets.
This ratio has been centered with respect to its overall sample mean. Finally, liquidity may
affect banks’ loan supply as more liquid banks may sell a part of their liquid assets to
compensate a drop in their deposits following a monetary policy tightening. Liquidity is the
liquidity ratio computed by dividing liquid assets by total assets, where liquid assets are
defined as the sum of cash and interbank operations (Liquid1). The ratio of liquid assets/total
assets is also centered with respect to its overall sample mean. Two other measures of
liquidity (Liquid2 and Liquid3, defined above) have been used in the estimations as
robustness checks. These measures are also centered with respect to their overall sample
mean.
To try to limit possible simultaneity problems, those interactions are always taken as their first
lag value. Nevertheless, because of the first differencing of the model, there remains a
potential problem of endogeneity. This problem has been tackled by using an appropriate
estimation procedure.
Besides the assumption about the interest rate elasticity of loan demand, another important
assumption is that including inflation and GDP growth in the model suffices to account for the
impact of the macroeconomic environment on loan demand. In order to check whether this
assumption holds, a second model has been estimated, where time dummies are included
instead of the macroeconomic variables. If the latter are sufficient, the results associated with
either model should be comparable as far as the interaction coefficients with monetary policy
are concerned. This second model is therefore estimated asECB • Working Paper No 101 • December 2001  19
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(2)
where all variables are defined as before, and  t λ  describes the time dummies.
We have chosen to introduce the three main banks' characteristics together: size, liquidity and
capitalization. So x stands for the three different characteristics all together. Indeed, as one can
notice from the description of section 2.1, these characteristics are not independent from each
other. Then, including them separately in a model is likely to generate an omitted variable
bias. Indeed, estimating models including only one characteristic at once leads to
unsatisfactory results (See table 6.a in Ehrmann et al. (2001)).
4.2 The econometric sample
A potentially severe problem comes from the large number of bank mergers that took place
during the observation period (see table 1 above). We have considered three different options
for the treatment of mergers: in the first option, merged entities are reconstructed backward as
the sum of the merging banks; in the second option, the merger is considered to give birth to a
new bank while the merging banks are kept in the sample for the period preceding the merger.
The last option is a mix of the first two ones: option 2 is applied if merging banks are of
similar size while option 1 is used for bank with significantly differing sizes (i.e. one of the
two banks is at least 2.5 times larger than the other one). However, our econometric results do
not change significantly whatever option is used. The results below refer to option 1.
Finally, outliers were discarded from the sample in the following way. For quarterly growth
rates of total assets, loans and deposits, all observations below the 2nd and above the 98th
percentile were treated as outliers. For the first difference in the capitalization and liquidity
ratios, the thresholds were set to the 1st and 99th percentiles. Moreover, a bank had to have at
least 6 successive observations in levels, i.e. 5 in growth rates, in order to be kept in the
sample. We are then left with an unbalanced panel comprising 312 banks over the years 1993-
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4.3 Estimating the impact of monetary policy on bank lending
4.3.1 Econometric issues
We have estimated the models as given in equation (1) and (2). However, including four lags
of the three macroeconomic variables and of their interactions with all bank characteristics led
to unsatisfactory results. Indeed, we faced a strong multicollinearity problem, implying a lack
of significance of almost all the estimated coefficients. We then decided to keep the
interactions of monetary policy with size, liquidity and capitalization but to discard all
interactions with GDP growth and inflation, which were much less significant than the ones
with monetary policy. The validity of this choice was confirmed by the fact that including
only one characteristic at a time interacted with monetary policy, GDP and inflation led to
insignificant estimates of the latter two
14. In other words, it seems that one can accept the
assumption that the loan demand elasticities with respect to GDP and inflation are
homogeneous across banks.
In order to account for the autoregressive nature of the model and for the possible endogeneity
of banks’ characteristics, the GMM estimator has been used. As instruments we used the
second and the third lags of the quarterly growth rate of loans, the second lag of the bank
characteristics and the first difference of the three months interbank interest rate. Moreover, to
increase efficiency, this instrument set has been expanded according to Arellano and Bond’s
procedure, i.e. all instruments have been multiplied by time dummies. According to the
Sargan test statistics we get, the instruments used are adequate. Then, one cannot reject the
assumption that the three months interbank interest rate is exogenous. Moreover, this statistic
together with the p-values of the m1 (disturbance serial correlation of order one) and m2
(disturbance serial correlation of order 2) statistics confirm our interpretation of the model as
the first difference of a “theoretical” specification in log levels. Indeed, the disturbances
appear to be MA(1), and thus to be uncorrelated with bank specific variables dated t-2 or less
and with lags 2 and 3 of the endogenous variable.
The results presented in table 5 are the GMM second step estimates. However, first step
estimates with robust standard errors do not significantly differ from those. Moreover,
                                                          
14 The results associated with the estimation of a model with only one characteristic at a time are not reported here,
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robustness checks have been done with respect to seasonality. Neither the inclusion of
seasonal dummies nor the inclusion of the fourth lag of the growth rate of loans in the
instrument set indicated any significant seasonality beside that implicitly taken into account
by the macro variables.
One can notice on table 5, that the results obtained with model (1), including macroeconomic
variables (column 1), are very similar to those obtained with model (2), including time
dummies (column 2), as regards the impact of monetary policy. Hence, model (1) correctly
accounts for the impact of macroeconomic evolutions. This is important in order to allow us
to interpret differences in the interaction coefficients as indications about heterogeneity in
banks’ lending behavior.
4.3.2 The overall impact of monetary policy
The first lines of the first panel in table 5 report the sum of coefficients of loans growth, of the
monetary policy indicator (i.e. the first differences of the interest rate), of real GDP growth,
and of inflation, while those of the second panel present the corresponding long run
coefficients. As previously mentioned, since bank characteristics have been normalized, these
coefficients give the impact of monetary policy, GDP and inflation on bank lending for a bank
with the average characteristics of the sample.
We find a significant response of banks’ loans to monetary policy. The average impact on
outstanding loans of banks is significant and amounts to a reduction of 1.4% in the “short-
run”, and 2% in the long run, for an increase of 100 base points in the interest rates. One has
to keep in mind that this average effect should not be interpreted in terms of a macroeconomic
effect as all banks are equally weighted in our econometric analysis (in particular, small and
large banks are all given a weight equal to 1).
4.3.3 The bank lending channel
The existence of asymmetries across banks in their reaction to a monetary policy tightening
can be assessed from the interaction coefficients, depending on whether they are significantly
positive or not. Those coefficients appear in the second part of the first two panels. Moreover,
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compute this impact for some sub-sample of banks. We have chosen to use 6 sub-samples
defined according to size, liquidity and capitalization characteristics of banks. For each sub-
sample we have computed the average size, liquidity and capitalization, in order to be able to
determine the impact of the kit of the three interaction terms for each sub-sample (see the
description of table 6 in appendix for further details). These figures are reported for “short”
and long run as MP interactions in the third panel of table 5.
Contrary to Favero, Giavazzi, and Flabbi (1999), who made a multinational comparative
study using BankScope data, we find some evidence of a lending channel in France. However,
one can have some doubts about their conclusions as they did not control for loan demand in
their model.
The impact of liquidity
Indeed, the existence of a lending channel can be assessed since our econometric results show
that more liquid banks do not respond to a monetary policy tightening as strongly as less
liquid banks do. The former use their liquidity to compensate the effects of a monetary policy
tightening. Indeed, the interaction coefficient with liquidity is positive and highly significant.
Banks appear to draw on their short-term interbank assets to soften the consequences of an
interest rate increase on their loan supply.
As liquidity appears to be important, two robustness checks have been done using the two
other alternatives (liquid 2 and liquid 3) which have been previously defined.
The third column of table 5 presents a first regression with the second measure of liquidity.
This measure is defined as the ratio of cash and interbank assets plus transaction and short
term investment securities over total assets. As one can notice the results are qualitatively
about the same than with a more restricted definition of liquidity. Nevertheless, although still
significantly positive, the magnitude of the interaction coefficient with liquidity appears to be
about one half that with the first definition of the liquidity ratio while there is less than a 1 to 2
ratio from one to the other. This is an indication that the impact of a restrictive monetary
policy on the banks’ securities portfolio is less important than that on its interbank assets. This
result is in accordance with one of the conclusions obtained by Baumel and Sevestre (2000)
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A third definition of the liquidity ratio, aimed at taking account of the net liquidity position of
banks
15, leads to qualitatively similar results (column 4) as far as liquidity is concerned.
Indeed, the liquidity interaction term is still significant, although this is not the case anymore
for the direct impact of monetary policy. Moreover, as shown below, this conclusion appears
to be robust to the particular treatment we applied to “mutual and cooperative banks”
networks.
The impact of size
Contrary to the results obtained by Kashyap and Stein (2000) for the US, size does not appear
to have any impact on the way banks respond to an increase in the monetary policy interest
rate. This result is similar to the one obtained for several other European countries (see
Ehrmann et al. (2001)). One possible explanation rests in the fact that, as previously shown,
small banks are significantly more liquid and capitalized than large ones
16, two factors that
may counter-balance the possible “negative” effect of size, as far as size induces asymmetric
information problems when banks look for external finance to compensate the decrease in
deposits they may experience after a monetary policy tightening. Another possible
explanation comes from the identification problem we might have. As underlined above, the
interaction coefficients we get account for differences in the loans supply behavior of banks as
long as one assumes that all banks face the same demand function as regards its interest rate
elasticity. However, Baumel and Sevestre (2000) have shown that the elasticity of demand
addressed to large banks is higher than that of the demand faced by small banks. A first
possible explanation of this discrepancy can be found in a possible heterogeneity in the banks’
clientele. Indeed, large banks’ customers are likely to be more frequently large firms than
those of small banks. Since access to non-bank external finance is easier for large firms, the
elasticity of loan demand by large firms is higher than that by small firms. Another
explanation might be the existence of stronger banks/firms relationships in small banks. In
any case, the interaction coefficient we get in our reduced form model results from the
composition of two different impact coefficients of interest rate variations, coefficients which
exhibit opposite magnitudes: for large banks (resp. small banks), the elasticity of supply may
be low (resp. high) while that of demand is large (resp. small), thus leading to a non
                                                          
15 This ratio (liquid 3) is defined as cash and interbank assets minus interbank liabilities divided by total assets
minus the minimum of interbank assets and liabilities.
16 Those differences exist in the US, too. However, they are of a much smaller magnitude.
significant impact of size on bank lending.ECB • Working Paper No 101 • December 2001 24
The impact of capitalization
The third bank characteristic we have considered, namely capitalization, does not seem to
impact significantly on bank lending behavior, everything else being equal. This result cannot
be explained by a lack of precision due to the correlations between size, liquidity and
capitalization. If this were the case, one would obtain significant coefficients when only one
interaction is included in the model (see table 6 in Ehrmann et al. (2001)). Again, most banks
with a low capitalization ratio are large banks, which may explain why this characteristic does
not appear to impact on banks’ loans supply. However, it might be the case that capitalization
matters for small banks only. In that case, one would expect to get a significant positive
coefficient when introducing the double interaction size-capitalization in the model. This is
not what we find when we estimate a model with a double interaction size-capitalization with
monetary policy, as we get an insignificant coefficient for this double interaction.
4.3.4 A tentative evaluation of the macroeconomic impact
As a consequence of these results, the “total long run” MP effect appears to be the strongest
for illiquid banks
17: an increase of 100 base points in the interest rates leads, in the long run, to
a reduction of 4.2 % in their outstanding loans. Conversely, for liquid banks, such an increase
in the monetary policy indicator induces an increase in bank lending, which however, is not
statistically significant.
This evaluation of the total response of bank lending to a monetary policy change can be
made for each bank separately. We can then compute a “macro” effect by weighting those
individual responses by the size of each bank, as measured by its market share on the loans
market, evaluated from our sample. We get a “macroeconomic” impact of -3.1%, stronger
than the above mentioned average effect. However, this macroeconomic effect should be
considered with some caution since, as stated above, all financial companies and specialized
financial institutions (which represent about 22% of all loans granted) have been discarded
from our sample.
                                                          
17 Illiquid banks are those banks with a liquidity ratio below the first decile, while liquid ones are those with a ratio
above the 9
th decile.ECB • Working Paper No 101 • December 2001  25
4.3.5 Robustness checks
Two types of robustness checks have been undertaken. The first one deals with the definition
of liquidity (see above), the second one with the convention chosen to tackle “mutual and
cooperative banks” as either individual entities or as global entities.
We report the results for three different samples: a sample including only commercial banks
(table 7), a sample including commercial banks and the four fictive banks as a representation
for the four “mutual and cooperative” banks’ networks (table 8), and a sample with
commercial banks, all the entities of the “mutual and cooperative banks”, and “savings and
provident institutions” (table 9).
One may notice from table 9, that the model is not accepted when all individual entities are
kept in the sample. The marginal significance of the Sargan test is below 5%. This is an
indication that treating all “mutual and cooperative” banks as independent banks is not the
best way to study their behavior.
Obviously, table 7 and 8 are very close to each other, since there are only three banks added in
the sample of table 8 (the periodicity of the data for one of the “mutual and cooperative
banks” networks is only annual instead of quarterly, so this bank has been discarded from the
sample). Contrary to the results in table 5, the direct impact of monetary policy does not
appear to be significant here (except in one case: when the second liquidity ratio is used and
the sample restricted to commercial banks). But the absolute values of the long-run monetary
coefficient are very close to each other in table 5 and 7. The lack of significance is thus
probably mostly due to the smaller number of banks involved in this set of regressions.
Nevertheless, our main conclusion remains: liquidity significantly affects bank lending
supply. This result is in accordance with that obtained for several other countries of the Euro
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5. Conclusion
The aim of this paper was to check for the possible existence of a bank lending channel in
France. For that purpose, we have estimated a dynamic reduced form model allowing for
asymmetries in loan supply across banks, depending on their size, liquidity and capitalization.
We have used a panel of 312 French banks observed quarterly over the period 1993-2000.
We find some asymmetry between liquid and illiquid banks, the latter being more sensitive to
a monetary policy tightening. This result is in accordance with that obtained for several other
countries of the Euro area (see Ehrmann et al. (2001)). It constitutes an indication that, as far
as they can, banks somehow reduce their liquid assets portfolio in order to maintain their loan
portfolio.
Contrarily to what has been found for the US (e.g., see Kashyap and Stein (1995, 2000) and
(size and capitalization) to have any significant impact on bank lending. Several explanations
can be proposed for this result. First, French small banks are, relatively speaking, most often
better capitalized than large ones. Then, there might be a kind of compensation between the
impacts of those two variables. However, including a double interaction of monetary policy
with size and capitalization does not lead to a significant coefficient. In other words, we have
not been able to show that small and under-capitalized banks shrink their loan supply after a
restrictive monetary policy more strongly than others. Another possible explanation of this
result, at least for size, is that the loan demand addressed to small banks is less elastic with
respect to the interest rate than that addressed to large banks (see Baumel and Sevestre
(2000)). This might explain why we do not get a significant coefficient for size. In our
reduced form model, this coefficient may not only account for loan supply differences across
small and large banks but also for loan demand differences, which go the other way round and
thus compensate each other.
At the “aggregate” level, our estimates show a significant impact of the monetary policy on
bank lending. An increase of 100 base points in the interest rate leads, in the long run, to a 1.5
to 2% decrease in the outstanding amount of loans for the “average bank” and of around 2.5 to
3% at the “aggregate level”.
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Nevertheless, some more work needs to be done to assess better the influence of monetary
policy decisions on bank lending. First, it would be probably more satisfactory to get an
evaluation of the impact of those decisions on new loans granted by banks rather than on their
outstanding amount. Indeed, banks cannot easily adjust downward their loan portfolio, at least
for long-term loans which represent a significant proportion of bank lending. Second, one
should also have a look at the impact of monetary policy on the interest rate charged by banks
to their customers (e.g. see Mojon (2001)). Indeed, the availability of bank loans to
households and businesses is important but does not totally reflect the consequences of
monetary policy decisions on the financing of non-bank economic agents.ECB • Working Paper No 101 • December 2001 28
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7 Appendix: Decomposition of the differential impact of monetary policy on bank
lending
Table 6 gives the decomposition of the computation of the MP interaction term for each sub-
sample as they appear in table 5. The first block column contains the average characteristics’
level (before normalization) for the whole sample and the 6 sub-samples. The bank
characteristics as well as the number of banks are given for the end of year 1998. The second
block column gives the values of these characteristics once they have been normalized (i.e. as
they are used in our computations). The third block gives the decomposition of the
computation of the “short-run” impacts while the fourth and last one gives that of the long-run
impacts. For example, the first column of the fourth block reports the direct long-term impact,
which is the total impact for the average of the sample. The second column reports the long-
term interaction coefficients (one line by characteristic), the third column is the product of the
previous column with the normalized value of the characteristics for the considered sub-
sample. Thus, the total for each sub-sample of the column “monetary interaction” is the same
figure than the one reported in table 5. The last column of the last block gives the long-run
total impact, which is obviously the total of the direct impact and of the sum of monetary
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Table 2: characteristics of MFIs







Commercial Banks (AFB) no none Can offer anything Nationwide
Mutual and Cooperative banks yes
none (for most of 
them)
Can offer anything, 
but there exist specific 
additional products 
(e.g. specific savings 
accounts: livret bleu 
Passbook for "mutual 
credit banks"). 
Regional areas
Savings and Provident 
Institutions (*)            
yes none
Can offer anything, 
but there exist specific 
additional products 
(e.g. specific savings 
accounts: livret A 
Passbook).
Regional areas
Municipal Credit banks no
mostly individuals and
some legal entities






Finance companies of type A no
Each institution has a 
specific Customer 
restriction. 
No deposits of less 
than two years. Each 
institution has a 
specific activity or 
product restriction 





authorised to carry out 
banking operations 
under laws and 
regulations proper to 
them
Finance companies of type B no
Each institution has a 
specific Customer 
restriction. 
No deposits of less 
than two years. Each 
institution has a 
specific activity or 
product restriction 






authorised to carry out 
banking operations by 
individual 
authorization
Specialized financial institutions no
Each institution has a 
specific Customer 
restriction. It might 
be: small firms and 
medium size firms, for 
example.
no deposits of less 
than two years
Nationwide
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Table 4: Banks description with respect to absolute and relative sizes
(December 1998)
Small Large Small Large
Number of banks 182 24 249 16 332
Mean assets (billions of euro) 0.313 66.741 0.770 92.326 6.398
Fraction of total assets 0.027 0.754 0.090 0.695 1
Mean deposits 0.182 33.000 0.492 44.885 3.393
Fraction of total deposits 0.029 0.703 0.109 0.638 1
Mean loans 0.124 26.788 0.343 37.907 2.576
Fraction of total loans 0.026 0.752 0.100 0.709 1
Loans/total assets 0.379 0.335 0.411 0.358 0.403
Deposits/total assets 0.549 0.491 0.581 0.438 0.585
Capital and reserves/total assets 0.123 0.034 0.106 0.037 0.089
Liquid1 0.455 0.317 0.416 0.294 0.401
Liquid2 0.523 0.491 0.481 0.454 0.481
Liquid3 0.236 0.095 0.216 0.034 0.203
Securities holding ratio 0.132 0.311 0.140 0.304 0.163
Interbank liabilities ratio 0.246 0.246 0.226 0.281 0.227
Securities liabilities ratio 0.040 0.196 0.046 0.206 0.062
Notes:
1) The sample excluding finance societies, specialized financial institutions and municipal credit banks then includes 520 banks
at the end of 1998. This sample should reduce to 435, when replacing regional banks of three of the "mutual and cooperative"
banks networks by the corresponding global entities. But four banks classified as ’’commercial’’ ones are in fact included in the
’’mutualand cooperative banks’’global entities. Then, they are also deleted and only 431 banks are kept in the sample. Moreover,
with the 1984 banking law, some finance societies decided to be classified as banks, despite they still have almost no deposits.
Numerous foreign banks affiliates have also almost no deposits. So banks with less than 10 % of deposits are discarded from the
sample. So we are left with 341 banks. Finally, banks with a share of loans over total assets lower than one percent have been
deleted too. So we are left with 332 banks in the population of banks having ’’significant’’ deposits and loans.
2) Absolute size: “Small” banks have assets less than 1 billion, while  “big” banks have assets more than 10 billions.
3) Relative size: A “small” bank has the average size of the banks below the third quartile, while a “big” bank has the average
size of the banks above the 95th percentile.
Banks characteristics
absolute size relative size 
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Table 5: Econometric results (to be continued)
Dependent variable : growth rate of loans (first difference of log)
MODEL 1: MP interaction MODEL 2: MP interaction MODEL 1: MP interaction MODEL 1: MP interaction
 All Bank characteristics  All Bank characteristics  check on liquidity definition  check on liquidity definition
Liquid2 Liquid3
Coeff. S.Error Coeff. S.Error Coeff. S.Error Coeff. S.Error
direct coefficients
sum of lags 0.289 *** 0.050 0.301 *** 0.056 0.307 *** 0.053 0.381 *** 0.053
Monetary policy(MP) -1.400 *** 0.403 -1.350 *** 0.432 -0.433 0.410
Real GDP 2.115 *** 0.318 2.392 *** 0.343 2.352 *** 0.338
Prices(CPI) -2.615 *** 0.393 -2.716 *** 0.401 -2.492 *** 0.412
interaction coeff.
Monetary policy(MP)*size -0.045 0.156 -0.093 0.163 -0.166 0.164 -0.257 0.174
Monetary policy(MP)*liquidity 5.762 *** 1.389 5.743 *** 1.539 2.810 ** 1.104 4.176 *** 0.856
Monetary policy(MP)*capitalization 1.638 4.969 1.546 5.271 3.875 5.097 -10.840 ** 4.978
Long-run 
direct coefficients
Monetary policy(MP) -1.969 *** 0.566 -1.948 *** 0.614 -0.700 0.662
Real GDP 2.975 *** 0.374 3.453 *** 0.412 3.801 *** 0.424
Prices(CPI) -3.678 *** 0.512 -3.920 *** 0.553 -4.028 *** 0.596
interaction coeff.
Monetary policy(MP)*size -0.063 0.218 -0.132 0.233 -0.240 0.236 -0.416 0.287
Monetary policy(MP)*liquidity 8.106 *** 1.931 8.211 *** 2.102 4.055 ** 1.588 6.750 *** 1.482
Monetary policy(MP)*capitalization 2.304 7.007 2.210 7.537 5.593 7.395 -17.530 ** 7.999
MP interaction for:
   high value of bank size. -0.623 0.568 -0.802 0.599 -0.711 0.570 -1.141 * 0.592
   low value of bank size. -0.041 0.114 -0.007 0.122 0.133 0.112 0.085 0.113
   high value of bank liquidity. 2.793 *** 0.707 2.817 *** 0.764 1.570 *** 0.521 2.184 *** 0.519
   low value of bank liquidity. -1.555 *** 0.389 -1.517 *** 0.432 -0.878 ** 0.366 -2.131 *** 0.524
   high value of bank capitalization. 0.541 0.948 0.626 1.009 1.459 0.926 -1.455 0.886
   low value of bank capitalization. 0.698 ** 0.291 0.684 ** 0.331 0.196 0.324 0.814 *** 0.251
MP interaction (long run) for:
   high value of bank size. -0.876 0.793 -1.147 0.851 -1.027 0.819 -1.844 * 0.991
   low value of bank size. -0.058 0.160 -0.009 0.175 0.192 0.162 0.137 0.185
   high value of bank liquidity. 3.928 *** 0.987 4.028 *** 1.045 2.266 *** 0.753 3.531 *** 0.906
   low value of bank liquidity. -2.188 *** 0.543 -2.169 *** 0.594 -1.267 ** 0.528 -3.445 *** 0.885
   high value of bank capitalization. 0.760 1.337 0.895 1.442 2.106 1.349 -2.352 * 1.409
   low value of bank capitalization. 0.982 ** 0.403 0.978 ** 0.466 0.284 0.467 1.316 *** 0.403
Total MP effect (long run) for:
   high value of bank size. -2.846 *** 0.951 -2.975 *** 1.041 -2.545 ** 1.240
   low value of bank size. -2.027 *** 0.604 -1.756 *** 0.645 -0.563 0.687
   high value of bank liquidity. 1.959 1.192 0.318 1.038 2.831 ** 1.134
   low value of bank liquidity. -4.157 *** 0.764 -3.215 *** 0.769 -4.157 *** 1.095
   high value of bank capitalization. -1.209 1.541 0.158 1.606 -3.053 * 1.651
   low value of bank capitalization. -0.987 0.660 -1.665 ** 0.713 0.615 0.714
Macroeconomic MP impact
-3.134 *** 0.958 -3.320 *** 1.062 -2.450 ** 1.242
Residual autocorr. tests
m1 -3.588 0.000 -3.584 0.000 -3.260 0.001 -4.224 0.000
m2 -0.863 0.388 -1.058 0.290 -0.751 0.453 -0.717 0.474
Sargan test (2-step) 122.669 0.231 105.892 0.376 126.309 0.168 137.486 0.051
Number of banks 312 312 312 313
Number of observations 5327 5327 5320 5279
Degrees of freedom 5290 5280 5283 5242
weighted average by loans market 
share
Note: Large and small banks are defined here as the top 5 % and bottom 75 % of the sample. Liquid (illiquid) and capitalized (low capitalized) banks are both defined as the 
top (bottom) 10 % of the sample. ECB • Working Paper No 101 • December 2001  37
Table 5: Econometric results (continued)
MODEL 1: MP interaction MODEL 2: MP interaction MODEL 1: MP interaction MODEL 1: MP interaction
 All Bank characteristics  All Bank characteristics  check on liquidity definition  check on liquidity definition
Liquid2 Liquid3
Coeff. S.Error Coeff. S.Error Coeff. S.Error Coeff. S.Error
Coefficients
Y(-1) 0.130 *** 0.033 0.145 *** 0.040 0.109 *** 0.034 0.181 *** 0.031
Y(-2) 0.118 *** 0.010 0.128 *** 0.011 0.099 *** 0.009 0.102 *** 0.008
Y(-3) 0.057 *** 0.010 0.058 *** 0.011 0.051 *** 0.010 0.052 *** 0.011
Y(-4) -0.016 0.031 -0.031 0.035 0.048 0.032 0.047 0.037
Dr -1.290 *** 0.280 -1.004 *** 0.269 -0.834 *** 0.308
Dr1 1.020 *** 0.266 0.698 *** 0.260 0.885 *** 0.287
Dr2 -1.127 *** 0.288 -1.008 *** 0.285 -1.012 *** 0.288
Dr3 0.186 0.194 0.126 0.189 0.221 0.196
Dr4 -0.189 0.228 -0.162 0.250 0.308 0.223
Dlrgdp -0.025 0.083 0.044 0.081 0.131 0.083
Dlrgdp1 0.301 ** 0.151 0.322 ** 0.158 0.159 0.159
Dlrgdp2 0.575 *** 0.113 0.627 *** 0.120 0.630 *** 0.127
Dlrgdp3 0.524 *** 0.143 0.701 *** 0.140 0.727 *** 0.156
Dlrgdp4 0.739 *** 0.127 0.699 *** 0.138 0.704 *** 0.126
Dlp 1.054 0.746 1.561 ** 0.759 1.056 0.800
Dlp1 -0.460 0.599 -1.257 ** 0.592 -0.666 0.598
Dlp2 0.479 0.838 0.444 0.923 -0.656 0.759
Dlp3 -2.271 *** 0.800 -1.855 ** 0.877 -0.444 0.723
Dlp4 -1.416 *** 0.539 -1.608 *** 0.518 -1.782 *** 0.543
size 0.003 *** 0.0006 0.003 *** 0.001 0.002 *** 0.0006 0.003 *** 0.0006
liq -0.005 0.004 -0.004 0.004 -0.002 0.003 -0.001 0.003
cap -0.035 *** 0.013 -0.037 ** 0.014 -0.071 *** 0.014 -0.053 *** 0.012
size*mp0 0.102 0.092 -0.036 0.105 0.061 0.093 0.076 0.095
size*mp0(-1) -0.260 ** 0.117 -0.254 ** 0.123 -0.410 *** 0.142 -0.221 0.150
size*mp0(-2) -0.161 0.110 -0.155 0.118 -0.129 0.115 -0.211 0.139
size*mp0(-3) 0.406 *** 0.118 0.469 *** 0.122 0.456 *** 0.116 0.189 0.133
size*mp0(-4) -0.131 ** 0.060 -0.117 * 0.062 -0.144 ** 0.065 -0.090 0.076
liq*mp0 1.874 ** 0.783 2.313 *** 0.795 1.874 ** 0.783 1.242 ** 0.553
liq*mp0(-1) 2.585 ** 1.075 2.008 * 1.173 0.084 0.685 0.867 0.676
liq*mp0(-2) -0.658 0.955 -0.065 0.989 2.532 ** 1.054 -0.124 0.551
liq*mp0(-3) 0.021 1.000 -0.159 1.072 -2.069 ** 0.907 1.393 ** 0.613
liq*mp0(-4) 1.941 *** 0.552 1.645 *** 0.634 1.912 *** 0.534 0.798 * 0.409
cap*mp0 -10.209 *** 2.903 -11.550 *** 2.969 -6.514 *** 2.457 -9.567 *** 2.485
cap*mp0(-1) 6.485 * 3.460 6.156 * 3.689 3.989 3.348 2.965 2.923
cap*mp0(-2) -12.862 *** 4.447 -8.730 * 4.717 -5.922 4.834 -10.110 ** 4.623
cap*mp0(-3) 14.090 *** 3.829 12.088 *** 4.053 9.223 ** 4.077 3.984 3.954
cap*mp0(-4) 4.134 ** 1.817 3.582 * 1.991 3.098 * 1.755 1.885 1.765
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Table 7: Econometric results for commercial banks only
MODEL 1: MP interaction MODEL 1: Robustness MODEL 1: Robustness
 check on liquidity definition  check on liquidity definition  check on liquidity definition
Liquid1 Liquid2 Liquid3
Coeff. S.Error Coeff. S.Error Coeff. S.Error
direct coefficients
sum of lags 0.612 *** 0.054 0.420 *** 0.049 0.452 *** 0.048
Monetary policy(MP) -0.785 0.703 -1.179 * 0.648 -0.460 0.583
Real GDP 2.088 *** 0.646 2.167 *** 0.611 2.072 *** 0.529
Prices(CPI) -2.552 *** 0.718 -2.981 *** 0.726 -2.740 *** 0.672
interaction coeff.
Monetary policy(MP)*size 0.146 0.243 0.433 * 0.229 0.555 ** 0.235
Monetary policy(MP)*liquidity 4.022 ** 1.627 3.230 ** 1.536 4.329 *** 1.136
Monetary policy(MP)*capitalization 2.373 5.700 1.460 5.176 -8.126 5.876
Long-run 
direct coefficients
Monetary policy(MP) -2.020 1.821 -2.035 * 1.114 -0.840 1.064
Real GDP 5.376 *** 1.471 3.739 *** 0.925 3.784 *** 0.817
Prices(CPI) -6.570 *** 1.621 -5.144 *** 1.081 -5.002 *** 1.057
interaction coeff.
Monetary policy(MP)*size 0.375 0.629 0.748 * 0.402 1.013 ** 0.432
Monetary policy(MP)*liquidity 10.353 ** 4.266 5.573 ** 2.67 7.905 *** 2.214
Monetary policy(MP)*capitalization 6.109 14.920 2.519 8.928 -14.840 10.682
MP interaction for:
   high value of bank size. -0.168 0.905 1.481 * 0.829 1.799 ** 0.910
   low value of bank size. -0.122 0.163 -0.304 ** 0.148 -0.425 ** 0.185
   high value of bank liquidity. 2.011 ** 0.809 1.210 * 0.671 2.308 *** 0.856
   low value of bank liquidity. -1.318 ** 0.528 -1.221 ** 0.535 -2.648 *** 0.727
   high value of bank capitalization. 0.368 1.350 -0.101 1.072 -2.479 * 1.484
   low value of bank capitalization. 0.535 0.438 0.557 0.404 1.224 *** 0.372
MP interaction (long run) for:
   high value of bank size. -0.431 2.330 2.555 * 1.456 3.284 ** 1.655
   low value of bank size. -0.313 0.415 -0.525 ** 0.261 -0.777 ** 0.334
   high value of bank liquidity. 5.175 ** 2.197 2.088 * 1.161 4.213 *** 1.634
   low value of bank liquidity. -3.392 ** 1.381 -2.106 ** 0.932 -4.835 *** 1.413
   high value of bank capitalization. 0.948 3.515 -0.175 1.851 -4.527 * 2.688
   low value of bank capitalization. 1.377 1.089 0.962 0.701 2.235 *** 0.686
Total MP effect (long run) for:
   high value of bank size. -2.451 3.025 0.520 1.840 2.444 1.992
   low value of bank size. -2.333 1.903 -2.560 ** 1.167 -1.617 1.143
   high value of bank liquidity. 3.155 2.850 0.053 1.553 3.373 * 2.050
   low value of bank liquidity. -5.412 ** 2.372 -4.141 *** 1.527 -5.675 *** 1.703
   high value of bank capitalization. -1.072 4.291 -2.210 2.346 -5.367 * 3.134
   low value of bank capitalization. -0.643 1.902 -1.073 1.154 1.395 1.117
Macroeconomic MP impact
-2.663 2.766 -0.288 1.700 1.579 1.801
Residual autocorr. tests
m1 -4.157 0.000 -3.696 0.000 -4.205 0.000
m2 -0.636 0.524 -0.859 0.390 -0.215 0.830
Sargan test (2-step) 115.247 0.398 111.108 0.506 120.839 0.268
Number of banks 255 256 252
Number of observations 3910 3904 3877
Degrees of freedom 3873 3867 3840
weighted average by loans market 
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MODEL 1: MP interaction MODEL 1: Robustness MODEL 1: Robustness
 check on liquidity definition  check on liquidity definition  check on liquidity definition
Liquid1 Liquid2 Liquid3
Coeff. S.Error Coeff. S.Error Coeff. S.Error
direct coefficients
sum of lags 0.591 *** 0.053 0.427 *** 0.049 0.447 *** 0.044
Monetary policy(MP) -0.822 0.695 -0.825 0.670 -0.445 0.583
Real GDP 2.099 *** 0.612 2.279 *** 0.588 2.090 *** 0.503
Prices(CPI) -2.517 *** 0.687 -2.761 *** 0.690 -2.583 *** 0.632
interaction coeff.
Monetary policy(MP)*size 0.037 0.209 0.272 0.194 0.301 0.195
Monetary policy(MP)*liquidity 4.102 ** 1.626 2.499 1.554 4.172 *** 1.125
Monetary policy(MP)*capitalization 0.763 5.727 2.902 5.165 -9.472 5.798
Long-run 
direct coefficients
Monetary policy(MP) -2.012 1.708 -1.440 1.155 -0.805 1.057
Real GDP 5.138 *** 1.363 3.974 *** 0.919 3.778 *** 0.782
Prices(CPI) -6.160 *** 1.536 -4.816 *** 1.056 -4.670 *** 1.016
interaction coeff.
Monetary policy(MP)*size 0.091 0.512 0.475 0.344 0.544 0.356
Monetary policy(MP)*liquidity 10.039 ** 4.017 4.358 2.698 7.543 *** 2.108
Monetary policy(MP)*capitalization 1.867 14.089 5.062 9.031 -17.120 10.504
MP interaction for:
   high value of bank size. -0.420 0.917 0.982 0.854 1.186 0.890
   low value of bank size. -0.067 0.160 -0.181 0.143 -0.285 * 0.172
   high value of bank liquidity. 2.005 ** 0.803 1.026 0.671 2.191 *** 0.818
   low value of bank liquidity. -1.302 ** 0.535 -0.986 * 0.545 -2.340 *** 0.699
   high value of bank capitalization. 0.091 1.195 0.449 1.062 -2.207 * 1.269
   low value of bank capitalization. -0.524 1.779 0.262 0.422 1.291 *** 0.374
MP interaction (long run) for:
   high value of bank size. -1.028 2.239 1.713 1.512 2.143 1.618
   low value of bank size. -0.163 0.389 -0.316 0.254 -0.515 * 0.312
   high value of bank liquidity. 4.907 ** 2.051 1.789 1.164 3.961 *** 1.511
   low value of bank liquidity. -3.186 ** 1.320 -1.721 * 0.949 -4.231 *** 1.303
   high value of bank capitalization. 0.223 2.933 0.784 1.853 -3.990 * 2.302
   low value of bank capitalization. 1.489 1.066 0.456 0.733 2.334 *** 0.691
Total MP effect (long run) for:
   high value of bank size. -3.040 2.862 0.273 1.867 1.339 1.946
   low value of bank size. -2.175 1.791 -1.756 1.221 -1.320 1.137
   high value of bank liquidity. 2.895 2.670 0.350 1.585 3.156 1.943
   low value of bank liquidity. -5.198 ** 2.250 -3.160 ** 1.587 -5.036 *** 1.616
   high value of bank capitalization. -1.789 3.731 -0.656 2.415 -4.795 * 2.794
   low value of bank capitalization. -0.524 1.779 -0.983 1.168 1.530 1.102
Macroeconomic MP impact
-3.175 2.887 0.098 1.897 1.612 1.951
Residual autocorr. tests
m1 -3.775 0.000 -3.655 0.000 -4.200 0.000
m2 -0.771 0.441 -0.907 0.364 -0.256 0.789
Sargan test (2-step) 113.925 0.432 107.983 0.590 118.260 0.324
Number of banks 258 259 255
Number of observations 3979 3973 3946
Degrees of freedom 3942 3936 3909
weighted average by loans market 
share
Table 8: Econometric results for commercial banks and "mutual and cooperative" banks 
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